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Abstract
The progressive ageing of a population leads to an increase in the number of people suf-
fering from cognitive deterioration. This requires particular attention in terms of the ne-
cessity to assess these people’s cognitive functions and their capacity to make decisions. 
The present systematic review analyses the clinical and ethical aspects of any assess-
ment of capacity, with a specific focus on the capacity of the individual to give informed 
consent for medical treatment and also with regard to their testamentary capacity. The 
results indicate that the concepts of capacity, competence and decision-making need to 
be better clarified, ad-hoc devised tools are required and a multidisciplinary, clinical and 
legal approach to assessments of capacity needs to be adopted. This is crucial to guaran-
tee that the two ethical principles of capacity assessment are adhered to: respect for an 
individual’s autonomy and the protection of fragile individuals.
INTRODUCTION
According to Art. 2 of the Italian Civil Code (CC), 
the Ability, or capacity, to act, or natural capacity, refers 
to an individual’s power to perform acts that are legally 
valid and effective. In Italy, this capacity is acquired at 
the age of eighteen, with some exceptions (e.g., sixteen 
for an employment contract). The term ability to act 
implies that the person is responsible for his/her acts 
and this differs from Legal capacity which is acquired 
at the time of birth and represents the condition of be-
ing a bearer of rights and duties (art. 1, Italian CC). 
Consequently, whereas legal capacity is guaranteed and 
recognised for every human being, the ability to act 
may be uncertain under some clinical conditions, such 
as mental deterioration. 
The assessment of patients’ ability to act and their de-
gree of awareness regarding the consequences of deci-
sions represents a challenge in both neuropsychological 
and legal fields and ethical dilemmas may arise.
Nowadays, this is a particularly relevant and urgent is-
sue due to the introduction in the Italian legal system 
of some regulations that allow individuals to delegate 
specific areas of decision to a “proxy” – that is, a Sup-
port Administrator or a Trustee. The figure of the Support 
Administrator (AdS) has been introduced in Italy (Law 
6/2004, artt. 404 onwards) [1] with the aim of chang-
ing the approach to the protection of vulnerable sub-
jects. The person is appointed by a tutelary judge with 
the aim of helping and safeguarding individuals who are 
no longer autonomous in terms of decision-making. The 
introduction of this figure is innovative in that the areas 
covered (for example decisions about asset management, 
daily purchases or medical treatments) are not based on 
a medical diagnosis but on the effective deficits and abili-
ties of each individual. The figure of the Trustee has been 
established as part of a recent legislation on informed 
consent and advance treatment directives (Law 19/2017) 
[2]; this proxy is directly appointed by the patients them-
selves, and represents them in dealings with doctors and 
healthcare facilities. Both these regulations represent 
useful opportunities for people who are unable to take 
decisions or are expected to have difficulties in the fu-
ture due to the diagnosis of a pathology. For the Support 
Administrator, it becomes crucial to determine the areas 
in which the proxy needs to make decisions. For this rea-
son, the judge may ask for a clinical assessment.
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In its clinical meaning, the ability to act indicates 
an individual’s capacity to perform tasks of varying de-
grees of complexity. This capacity relies on cognitive 
functions such as, for example, decision-making abili-
ties. However, the capacity to act also depends on the 
congruency between each individual’s ability and the 
contingencies involved (i.e., the specific situation in 
which a decision is taken). This implies that a clinical 
assessment should pursue the maximum coincidence 
between these factors.
It is worth noting that, although a clinician’s opinion 
may have a relevant weight in the final decision of a 
judge, the outcome of this assessment is rather a legal 
matter [3, 4].
The assessment and determination of capacity are 
particularly sensitive fields of investigation [5, 6]. On 
one hand, a judgment of incapacity may lead to a sig-
nificant reduction in a person’s rights, while on the 
other hand, not recognising a decrease in capacity can 
expose a patient with dementia, as well as other people, 
to various risks (domestic accidents, failure to plan both 
simple and complex actions, necessity to request assis-
tance, etc.). For this reason, any reductions in a per-
son’s rights must necessarily be offset by an evaluation 
of what is in the “best interest” of that person and his/
her family.
As a result, any assessment of capacity needs to take 
into account the reasons underlying the request for an 
evaluation, the patient’s environment, his/her affective, 
social and financial resources and any potential benefits 
resulting from the adoption of support measures, such 
as the appointment of a legal proxy.
Since the prevalence of dementia increases dramati-
cally with age, capacity assessments – previously a mar-
ginal aspect of clinical and legal practice – have become 
a common issue. There are many areas involving capac-
ity that clinicians may be called to examine (for medical 
and/or legal purposes) including the individual’s capac-
ity to consent to treatment, to act as a witness, to make 
a will, to manage their finances, to vote, to drive, to 
carry out a profession, and so on. In particular, in ad-
dition to the assessment of the ability to express their 
informed consent (essential for a patient following a 
medical therapy or participating in a clinical trial), clini-
cians are more and more required to assess the ability 
of elderly people to make a valid will. Indeed, Italian 
law states that some patrimonial acts may not be valid if 
performed by a person who is deemed incapable to act, 
although not prohibited from doing so (art. 428, CC).
This study was prompted by a document published 
in Italy by the “Ethics” sub-group within the National 
Dementia Plan (www.regioni.it/newsletter/n-3900/del-
10-08-2020/raccomandazioni-per-la-governance-e- la-
clinica-nel-settore-delle-demenze-21590/) [7], which 
some of the authors of this paper take part in as experts. 
The search for scientific sources was further extended 
with the aim of raising awareness concerning the ethi-
cal debate on respect in clinical and legal fields for the 
autonomy of patients with dementia. Then, we focused 
on the assessment of two specific capacities that have 
become more and more important: clinical and testa-
mentary capacities.
METHODOLOGY
A search of the literature on the subject was car-
ried out using PubMed, PCM and Cochrane Library 
databases. It took into consideration English language 
publications from January 1990 to June 2020. Over this 
period, there is an enormous quantity of papers (7,098) 
on both the ethical and methodological aspects of as-
sessing the capacities of patients suffering from demen-
tia indicating the relevance of this topic in scientific 
research.
In order to narrow down the research, a further 
search was run which focused only on systematic and 
major reviews. The following keywords were entered: 
[dementia] AND [decision-making] or [competence 
evaluation] or [informed consent] or [ethics] or [tes-
tamentary capacity] or [Testamentary capacity evalua-
tion] AND [review] or [systematic review].
RESULTS
The second search yielded 1,821 articles. Further 
screening was then carried out following the process 
outlined in the PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items 
for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) [8] state-
ment for systematic reviews and the outcome of this is 
shown in Figure 1. Forty-four articles met the eligibility 
criteria: 12 systematic reviews, 21 reviews and 2 brief 
reviews, 2 integrative reviews, 2 narrative reviews, 2 
clinical reviews, 1 critical review, 1 methodology review 
and 1 literature review; in addition, there were 46 ref-
erenced papers, 6 web resources and 5 books, giving a 
total of 101 references. Among the 44 reviews included 
in the study, 12 mainly addressed the decision-making 
process, 13 informed consent, 6 ethical issues, 5 as-
sessments of capacity and there were also 8 concerning 
financial and testamentary capacity. It is worth noting 
that this classification was not rigid as in reality a num-
ber of these studies addressed multiple aspects. The 
studies selected are summarised in the Supplementary 
Material available online.
In the following sections, the results are outlined 
starting with a definition of the main constructs (that is, 
capacity, competence and decision-making) that form 
the basis of any assessment of capacity. Two specific ca-
pacities and the assessment of these are then discussed: 
the capacity to give informed consent and testamentary 
capacity.
Competence, capacity and decision-making:  
three concepts in one 
A long-standing, heated debate concerns the disam-
biguation of the concepts of “competence” and “capac-
ity”, but some confusion in the clinical field remains. In 
many countries, both terms are often used interchange-
ably, although in the scientific and legal literature on 
the subject, subtle differences are sometimes reported 
(Table 1).
Both in medical and legal terms, capacity is primarily 
considered to be established by means of a clinical as-
sessment. It has been variously defined as: i) the ability 
to learn, process and make decisions based on available 
information [9]; ii) the individual’s capacity to decide or 
to perform daily life activities, such as working, driving, 
























looking after relatives, making medical decisions, and 
entering into legal contracts [10] and iii) the functional 
determination of whether an individual has the ability 
to adequately make a context-specific decision [11].
In contrast, competence is generally considered to be 
established legally and is defined as: i) the legal deter-
mination of whether an impaired mental capacity limits 
a patient’s ability to make legally relevant decisions or 
actions [12]; ii) a legal construct established and gov-
erned by the courts [10] and iii) a legal state, namely 
the degree of mental soundness necessary to make de-
cisions about a specific issue or to carry out a specific 
act [13].
In Italy, capacity and competence are synonyms and 
are used interchangeably to indicate the ability of an 
individual to use personal, social and/or methodological 
skills in various different contexts [3].
For the purposes of the present study, and in an effort 
to overcome confusing terminology, we will refer to the 
term capacity as the equivalent of competence.
The notion of capacity is closely related to that of 
decision-making, namely, the process of selecting an ap-
propriate action from a number of possible options. 
Decision-making involves many cognitive processes, 
including selecting one’s goal and motivation, weighing 
the potential consequences of different options, and 
determining expected consequences [12]. The loss of 
decision-making capacities represents one of the most 
dramatic consequences of cognitive decline in patients 
with neurological or psychiatric disorders, and it pro-
gressively affects everyday life and medical and legal 
choices, thus potentially exposing patients to the risk of 
adverse events and financial abuse [17-19]. The preva-
lence of disorders in decision-making in patients suffer-
ing from cognitive decline is consistent, ranging from 
a percentage of 34% of hospitalised patients to 45% of 
psychiatric patients [20].
Multiple cognitive functions, in particular executive 
functions, contribute to the case of decision-making 
deficits in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) [21-23]. Never-
theless, a recent systematic review [24] has shown that 
in people with dementia, factors other than cognitive 
impairment contribute to decision-making abilities, in-
cluding varying degrees of freedom of choice and con-
textual factors (e.g. socio-economic and personal fac-
tors).
The role of emotions and motivation also needs to be 
considered, as these can help a patient to understand 
various situations and take appropriate decisions despite 
a deficit in their decision-making abilities. Emotions 
represent a source of knowledge that provides crucial 
information about the internal states of an individual 
and the responses to external events; these are essential 
in order to reach decisions that are consistent with the 
individuals’ value system. This refers to the concept of 
“authenticity”, that indicates a congruency between an 
individual’s values (i.e., their beliefs, relationships and 
commitments) and their decisions. In contrast to “au-
tonomy” – which mainly refers to situations in which an 
individual exercises their right to express self-determi-
nation – “authenticity” does not require an intact capac-
ity of self-determination, but only that the decision is 
consistent with the individual’s values [25]. In people 
suffering from dementia, the relationship between au-
tonomy and authenticity is complex as a patient may 
be lacking in self-determination but conserve ethically 
relevant skills such as communicating a preference, 
maintaining relationships and certain levels of decision-
making [25, 26], including the ability to appoint a proxy 
for specific areas of decision [2]. It is therefore worth 
remembering that cognition and emotions are closely 
interconnected in all the decision-making processes, 
as cognition involves affective values when reaching a 
choice, and that inadequate levels of emotional activa-
tion – both reduced or in excess – may raise doubts on 
the appropriateness of the decision.
A recent review [27] recommends a more active role 
in the decisional process for patients with dementia, 
and shows that in mild to moderate stages, patients 
would like to be involved in day-to-day decision-mak-
ing, especially with regard to health, financial and end-
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who can no longer make decisions for themselves. For 
them, family members in the role of surrogate decision 
makers are usually preferred since the family is the pri-
mary social unit involved in safeguarding the patient’s 
welfare and wishes [28].
Experimental studies on the neuronal bases relating 
to decision-making have often focused on this interface 
between cognitive and emotional abilities. Overlaps 
have been found between cognitive and emotional abili-
ties networks in the frontal, temporal and parietal areas, 
such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the medial 
prefrontal cortex, the medial temporal structures and 
the precuneus [29]. A lack of equilibrium between 
these networks has also been suggested as a cognitive 
marker of a deficit in decision-making, and as an em-
pirical criterion for an impairment in cognitive abilities 
relating to informed consent [30]. The neural correlates 
of decision-making have also been assessed in relation 
to the neuroanatomical changes that occur in several 
neurodegenerative diseases [22], showing an elevated 
correlation between executive functions (planning, an-
ticipation, judgment, reasoning) and decision-making. 
On the whole, although the anatomical model for deci-
sion-making is still being studied, there is a broad con-
sensus with regard to the involvement of an extended 
neuronal network, including frontostriatal and limbic 
loops, the orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices, 
the parietal cortex, the striatum, the amygdala and the 
basal ganglia [31].
Accordingly, decision-making can be considered to 
be a multidimensional construct rather than a single 
function, and it depends on the integrity of attention, 
orientation, memory and executive functions to ensure 
inferential processes [32], and is closely related to the 
appropriateness and intensity of emotions expressed 
[33].
The assessment of capacity
Evaluating whether or not a patient is able to make 
decisions in the real world is sometimes a challenge 
for clinicians. The necessity for this type of evaluation 
arises in particular when the clinician is faced with a pa-
tient with behavioural or cognitive symptoms which are 
suggestive of a decline in his/her abilities. Although a 
number of different tools have been developed, the ab-
sence of a “gold standard” persists making assessments 
difficult [34].
Freedman, Stuss and Gordon [32] proposed some 
guidelines for assessing capacities which focus on the 
evaluation of neurobehavioral deficits rather than on 
the neuropathology of disorders. The authors argue that 
the ability to make competent decisions depends on the 
nature and severity of the cognitive impairment, rather 
than on its cause. Sturman [35] shared a similar point 
of view and assumed that mental illness represents a 
risk factor for – but does not automatically define – a 
condition of incapacity. Similarly, Johnson and Kar-
lawish [36] claimed that a diagnosis of AD in the mild 
to moderate stage did not coincide with an automatic 
judgment of incapacity: clinicians need to look at the 
Table 1
Definitions of capacity and competence
Authors Capacity Competence
Ganzini et al., 2005 [14] A clinical assessment of a patient’s ability to 
make specific healthcare decisions:
evaluated by physicians
specific, not comprehensive
A legal term used to describe a person’s overall, 
comprehensive ability to make decisions:
decided by a court/judge
permanent unless overturned by a court/judge
Resnick and Sorrentino, 
2005 [13]
An individual’s ability to make an informed 
decision
The degree of mental soundness necessary to make 
decisions about a specific issue or to carry out a specific 
act
Moberg and Kniele, 2006 
[8]
An individual’s capacity to decide or to perform 
activities of daily living
a legal construct established and governed by courts
Willner, 2011 [15] The ability to make decisions The ability to perform actions needed to put decisions 
into effects
Moye, Marson, Edelstein, 
2013 [11]
Clinical capacity: the functional determination of whether an individual has the ability to adequately make a 
context-specific decision
Legal capacity: the specific ability or abilities which are sufficient to carry out a specific action according to law. 
Stracciari, Bianchi, Sartori, 
2014 [3]
Legal capacity or “legal competence”: ability to make a decision, regardless of its reasonableness
Clinical capacity or “clinical competence”: set of skills that allow individuals to perform more or less complex 
actions.  
Darby et al.  2017 [12] The functional determination of whether a 
patient has the ability to adequately make a 
specific decision, such as financial decisions, or 
perform a specific task, such as driving
The legal determination of whether an impaired mental 
capacity limits a patient’s ability to make a legally relevant 
decision or action
Sabatino, 2018 [16] Clinical capacity is specific to a particular health 
care decision  
Also called legal capacity, this is a legal status. It cannot be 
determined by health care practitioners
Gossman et al., 2019 [9] The ability to learn, process, and make decisions 
based on information given
A legal term, stating that a court of law has decided 
whether a person can make his/her own decisions. A legal 
declaration of incompetence may be global, or it may be 
limited
























severity of the general cognitive impairment of each 
individual patient and should specifically assess his/her 
decisional capacity.
The necessity for an extensive cognitive assess-
ment may be decided after the administration of short 
screening measures, and, among these, there is a broad 
consensus that the use of MMSE is useful. The cut-off 
scores considered to indicate an individual’s capacity 
range from <19 (i.e. it is probable that the patient’s abil-
ity to give consent is reduced) to ≥23 (i.e. it is probable 
that the patient’s ability to give consent is adequate), 
depending on the risk/benefit ratio; a cut-off of 25 has 
been suggested to discriminate competent and incom-
petent individuals, with a sensitivity between 91% and 
100% [37-39]. Marson’s model [6] provides a score ≥20 
for capacity, that however needs to be supported by 
non-pathological results involving tests for verbal fluen-
cy, attentional/executive capacities and logical memory. 
Of course, given their inherent limitations, screening 
tests should not be used alone to assess capacity [40].
Some authors [41, 42] have suggested that capacity 
assessments should be divided into at least three steps: 
a) a general cognitive level, b) specific cognitive abilities 
and c) an ecological survey. Sullivan [43] emphasised 
the fact that capacity is “decision specific” and suggest-
ed the necessity of planning assessments using this key 
concept as a base; her two-stage approach recommends 
an assessment of basic cognitive skills (e.g. orientation, 
reasoning/judgment, general knowledge and memory), 
followed by the administration of tasks focusing on spe-
cific skills. These skills would be assessed by means of 
ad-hoc devised tests or structured interviews.
In their extensive review, Moberg and Kniele [10] also 
recommend the use of multiple approaches for an ethi-
cal evaluation of capacity. They advise that since there 
is no single tool capable of evaluating ability, clinicians 
must integrate various approaches and standardised 
measures in order to adequately cover the various skills 
and attitudes pertaining to everyday life. Observation of 
a patient in the context of his/her day-to-day life would 
be the best approach, but this is often impossible for 
practical reasons. Thus, considering the absence of spe-
cific, standardised tools and the difficulties associated 
with directly observing an individual’s abilities in their 
daily life, the authors recommended following a num-
ber of steps: i) a detailed interview with both the patient 
and caregiver(s); ii) a neuropsychological examination 
carried out by means of validated tools; iii) an evalua-
tion of functional skills and iv) a check of the legal refer-
ence standards.
Furthermore, whenever possible, the examiner should 
identify and advise the adoption of supportive strategies 
(e.g. a prosthetic environment) to improve the patient’s 
abilities. In fact, the principle of showing respect for 
each single individual is, according to them, fundamen-
tal in an ethical approach of capacity assessment that 
needs to be shaped and tailored to each patient.
In Italy, Stracciari, Bianchi and Sartori [3] proposed 
an all-inclusive three-stage approach to the evaluation 
of capacity. The first step, called “Evaluation”, involves 
the administration of interviews to the patient and his/
her family members, an examination of the patient’s 
cognitive functions and an analysis of their functional 
skills in a daily life context. The second step involves 
the “Interpretation” of the data collected in the light of 
legal standards and requirements, taking into account 
the potential consequences of the patient’s decisions. A 
final step entitled “Rehabilitation” involves the planning 
of interventions aimed at cognitive reactivation and 
support (that is, a prosthetic environment). A recent 
document published in Italy as part of the National 
Dementia Plan [7] also recommended an accurate neu-
rocognitive assessment and provided a two-level evalua-
tion algorithm depending on the severity of the disease, 
as well as a list of useful tests.
The picture that emerges from the literature shows 
that there is a need to follow a complex procedure when 
assessing capacity, one that requires multiple profes-
sional competences and a multidimensional approach. 
Two main principles would guide this procedure: i) a 
balance between demonstrating respect for the patient’s 
autonomy (i.e. self-determination and the freedom of 
choice) and patient safety and ii) taking into account 
not only the patient’s disabilities but also any residual 
abilities (for example, coping strategies).
Informed consent
The term Informed consent refers to clinical capacity, 
that is, an individual’s free and voluntary choice to par-
ticipate in a course of treatment or a research project. 
This, therefore, represents a central requirement of 
ethical research involving human participants [44]. The 
importance of an individual’s expression of will came 
to be seen as fundamental after the Second World War 
and originated as part of the Nuremberg Code (1946) 
that established that participation in research needs to 
be voluntary, with the freedom for any person to choose 
participation after adequate understanding of the ex-
perimental procedures involved. This means that the 
person involved in a course of treatment should have 
the legal capacity to give consent and that whenever a 
clinical condition induces doubts, the patient’s ability to 
give consent needs to be assessed.
Informed consent has been extensively studied with 
reference to many pathologies and deficits in this ca-
pacity have been reported in learning disabilities, as 
well as in psychiatric and neurological disorders [45]. 
In the mild stage of dementia, patients with a good in-
sight into their condition are often sufficiently compe-
tent to make decisions regarding their treatment and 
wish to be involved to the extent that their abilities al-
low [36]. However, capacity to consent may fluctuate 
over time, depending on various factors, both medical 
(e.g. drug therapy) and clinical (hydration status, pain, 
etc.), which mean that the risk of misunderstandings 
may arise [46].
Over the last few decades, the issue of informed con-
sent has played a major role in the debate concerning 
bioethics. There is a need to guarantee the individual’s 
right to self-determination, even in presence of re-
duced cognitive capacity. The Mental Capacity Act was 
brought into force in England and Wales in 2005 with 
the aim of empowering and protecting people who may 
not be able to make some decisions for themselves [47], 
























and established that patients must be adequately sup-
ported in expressing any residual decision-making skills. 
These skills rely on certain functional abilities, as sum-
marised by four functions: Understanding, Evaluation, 
Reasoning, and Expression of a choice [48].
The concept of informed consent therefore stems 
from the legal concern that patients should have ad-
equate information to make informed decisions regard-
ing medical treatments. However, information alone 
is not enough for an informed choice: the individual’s 
freedom of choice needs to be guaranteed and his/
her ability to use this information to make a rational 
choice preserved [44]. All of the ethical and legal is-
sues concerning the assessment of this capacity stem 
from this latter point. Any assessment should therefore 
reflect the best balance between two extremes: on the 
one hand, the principle of protecting the patient from 
choices which may be potentially dangerous for his/her 
health, and on the other hand, the principle of invio-
lability of individual choice. This dilemma represents 
a point which is crucial to the debate on bioethics, as 
emphasised by some authors who have suggested that 
not adhering to a principle which safeguards patients 
with a reduced capacity to act may lead to the risk of 
“abandoning patients to their rights” [49].
The guidelines and standard procedures relating to 
obtaining informed consent have long been based on 
the simple assumption that consent is presumed if a 
patient does not provide explicit dissent. However, this 
assumption represents a meagre protection for patients 
who lack competence [36]. Indeed, this first principle 
has evolved over time into the current concepts of self-
determination and autonomy as well as of a kind of 
therapeutic alliance involving mutual respect. However, 
despite this change in perspective, these principles still 
suffer from a lack of standardisation and adequacy with 
regard to the instruments available [50]. To date, in-
formed consent has often been considered merely a for-
mality, that is, a document to be signed by the patient 
to protect institutions and clinicians (rather than the 
patients themselves) in case there are accidents during 
the medical procedures. Furthermore, the consent form 
itself is invariably too complex, and is often incompre-
hensible (not only to those with a lower standard of 
education) [50] as language that is unfamiliar to the 
patient is used. Adopting clear, non-technical language 
and short consent forms which are appropriate to the 
patient’s language skills is thus to be recommended 
[51]. A recent study in Italy [52] shows that the use 
of simplified texts considerably increases the possibility 
of patients with AD understanding the contents of the 
documents and thus being able to more easily express 
their preferences.
In fact, informed consent is not a one-time event but 
an interactive process, in particular for patients suffer-
ing from mental deterioration. The above-mentioned 
document in the Italian National Dementia Plan [7] 
states that information need not be fully transmitted 
at the beginning of the therapeutic relationship, but 
gradually provided as the clinical sessions progress in 
a way that is consistent with the progression of the in-
dividual’s situation with regard to their medical condi-
tion, thereby integrating new information and advice. 
In this way, any request for informed consent regarding 
specific procedures becomes the result of a relationship 
built on trust based on the principles of protection and 
auto-determination.
As previously reported, four key elements in the con-
sent procedure relating to treatment for medical (or re-
search) purposes are recognised in the most widespread 
models of clinical competence [48, 53]: a) Understand-
ing: the ability to understand information and the po-
tential risks/benefits of a course of treatment (or of the 
lack of treatment); (b) Appreciation: the ability to apply 
the information received to one’s own condition; (c) 
Reasoning: ensuring that the patient’s decision reflects a 
consequential and comparative process, indicating a ra-
tional reasoning process based on the information; and 
(d) Choice: referring to an individual’s ability to com-
municate a decision.
People suffering from dementia may be competent to 
make decisions regarding simple courses of treatment 
but incompetent when a choice requires them to weigh 
and balance the risks and benefits, or when the outcome 
is uncertain. Thus, thresholds for capacity vary accord-
ing to the complexity and uncertainty of the decision in 
question: the higher the risk and uncertainty, the higher 
the threshold [54]. Some legal standards have been pro-
posed based on the fact that there are various degrees 
of capacity that patients may reveal when faced with a 
specific decision. These standards can be easily applied 
to other competencies to consent, and to decision-mak-
ing capacities in general (Table 2) [55, 56]
An additional ability [LS2] – making a reasonable 
Table 2
Legal Standards [LS] for capacity, according to the complexity and uncertainty of the decision: the higher the risk and uncertainty, 
the higher the threshold. [LS2] is not accepted for judging the capacity since the reference to “what is a reasonable choice” is 
arbitrary
Legal standard
LS1 (advanced stage) Evidencing a treatment choice: this standard focuses on the presence or absence of a decision alone
LS3 (moderate stage) Appreciating consequences of treatment choice: this standard emphasises the patient’s awareness about 
the emotional impact and future consequences of their decision regarding treatment 
LS4 (mild to moderate stage) Providing rational reasons for treatment choice: capacity to use logical processes to compare the benefits 
and risks of various options
LS5 (mild stage) Understanding treatments, situation, and choice: this standard requires memory for sequences of 
information about the treatment and their comprehension
























choice regarding treatment when the alternative is unreason-
able – is not accepted as a legal standard for judging the 
capacity to consent since the reference to “what is a 
reasonable choice” is arbitrary [57].
The assessment of an individual’s capacity  
with regard to informed consent
Any assessment of capacity to consent to a course 
of treatment is challenging in cognitively impaired pa-
tients, but also crucial in order to respect the two prin-
ciples of protection and auto-determination. Variable 
competence rates in elderly people are reported [58], 
with 54% of full competence among AD patients, 44% 
in nursing home residents and 68% in patients with 
learning disorders; however, the same study indicates 
that clinical judgment alone is reliable in only 42% of 
cases, with a prevalence of false negative over false posi-
tive results.
To date, the assessment tools available fall into two 
categories: traditional psychometric tests and ad hoc 
structured interviews/questionnaires. Both of these 
methods have advantages and limitations, so a combi-
nation of the two used in tandem is a good solution. 
Furthermore, it is important to investigate the role of 
emotions in the decision-making process, through both 
structured tools and in-depth psychological observa-
tions in clinical settings.
Several reviews on cognitive tools have been pub-
lished over the last decade, but only a few of these have 
been systematic (see Supplementary Material available 
online). A possible reason for the scarcity of contribu-
tions in this area is exemplified by the fact that a study 
by Hein and colleagues was initially (2014) published 
on the Cochrane Library website but was later with-
drawn with the reason given that: “there is currently no 
clear diagnostic gold standard to compare the reviewed 
diagnostic tests making it impossible to assess the sensi-
tivity and specificity of measures” (Cochrane Database 
of Systematic Reviews, 2015).
In effect, we found only two systematic reviews on 
this topic: the first [34] concerns assessments of capac-
ity according to legal requirements in the UK, and the 
second [59] focuses on various different instruments 
that measure decision-making capacities in a medical 
setting. Both studies focused on two critical features: i) 
the fact that despite a wide range of instruments, there 
is no gold standard for the assessment of capacity, and 
this hampers any evaluation of the various different 
approaches and ii) none of the instruments available 
provides a clinical cut-off score that physicians can use 
to determine whether a patient has sufficient decision-
making capabilities. However, even though this last fac-
tor may be considered to be a limitation, it is worth 
nothing that not having a pre-defined cut-off is very 
much in line with the idea that decision-making is not 
an all-or-nothing process. An integration between the 
opinion of a healthcare professional and the results of a 
structured assessment process would therefore consti-
tute the most robust approach [34].
The association between informed consent and vari-
ous specific cognitive domains has been widely studied 
over the last twenty years [60-62]. Extensive intra-
individual variability in performance has proven to be 
predictive of a higher risk of deficits in decision-making 
capacities [63]. More specifically, studies assessing 
people’s ability to give their consent to treatment have 
suggested that measures related to executive functions 
are the main predictive factors [64]. However, to date, 
there has not been a clear pattern of association be-
tween specific cognitive skills and decision-making, and 
the lack of a gold standard hampers the validation of 
specific instruments [65]. In an attempt to define the 
predictors of a person’s ability to consent, Marson [6] 
examined the correlational studies between the Capac-
ity to Consent to Treatment Instrument (CCTI) and 
Legal Standards (LS). Deficits in semantic memory, 
conceptualisation and verbal recall appear to be associ-
ated with reduced Understanding and Choice in mild 
to moderate stages of Alzheimer’s disease (LS5). Defi-
cits in executive functions are associated with reduced 
capacity for Appreciation and Reasoning in mild to 
moderate stages of dementia (LS4) and the identifica-
tion of the consequences of the choice made in moder-
ate stages (LS3). Finally, deficits in receptive language 
and semantic memory (naming) are associated with a 
reduced ability to communicate a simple choice in ad-
vanced stages of dementia (LS1).
Among structured interviews and/or questionnaires 
which assess clinical competence, Dunn, et al. [66] in-
dicated the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool 
for Treatment (MacCAT-T) and for Clinical Research 
(MacCAT-CR) as the best choices for measuring ca-
pacity to consent to treatment and research, due to 
their comprehensiveness and supporting psychometric 
data. Sessums, et al [58], however, reported the Aid to 
Capacity Evaluation (ACE) as being the best instru-
ment to assist physicians in the assessment of medical 
decision-making capacities. This tool is available on the 
University of Toronto website and should always be as-
sociated with an MMSE lower than 24. However, this 
combination is not sufficient to determine capacity in 
patients with focal neurological disorders, and a com-
prehensive cognitive evaluation is always required [67].
The CCTI is similar to the ACE but has mainly been 
validated with AD patients. It shows a good correlation 
with several neuropsychological tasks [4], including 
phonemic and semantic fluency tests. In their model, 
Marson, et al [4] concluded that the integrity of frontal 
functions is a critical aspect in the assessment of deci-
sional capacity, whereas memory defects are considered 
to be an “operational” deficit which may be compen-
sated for by reminders [68].
While the standardisation of materials and proce-
dures is quite simple for the cognitive tests that are 
used in clinical practice, any adaptation of interviews 
structured in order to cover specific situations may 
compromise the internal consistency of the test. In fact, 
standardisation is a key attribute for all psychometric 
tools, and any changes in content can potentially lead 
to a bias on inter-rater and test-retest reliability [69]. In 
principle, interviews may be useful in terms of guiding 
the assessment and supporting an experienced clinical 
judgment, but they cannot replace this latter [60, 70]. 
For example, the MacCAT-T takes into account the 
























interactive and contextual nature of capacity and thus 
intentionally does not provide cut-off scores and relies 
on the collection of additional information such as in-
terviews with family members, behavioural and ecologi-
cal observations and an evaluation of the patient’s value 
system.
In conclusion, despite the fact that there are many 
instruments and tools, a comprehensive assessment of 
capacity is often difficult and requires time. Moreover, 
the majority of instruments require further testing [70]. 
The MacCAT-T and the CCTI are currently the most 
widely used interviews and the latter seems nowadays 
to be the only one with normative values [4]. However, 
research on this topic is still ongoing, as confirmed by 
a number of reports of new tools, such as, for example, 
the University of California Brief Assessment of Ca-
pacity to Consent (UBACC). This is considered to be 
particularly promising as a result of both its simplicity 
and its applicability in clinical practice [45], but it is 
currently only applied to patients with psychiatric dis-
orders.
Unfortunately, none of the above-mentioned instru-
ments are available in Italian.
An emerging area of clinical and legal interest: 
testamentary capacity
In western societies, requests for assessments of tes-
tamentary capacity have been increasing since many 
populations are progressively ageing and illnesses re-
lated to dementia are more prevalent. In addition, re-
lationships have become more and more complex in 
terms of financial aspects and family structures now of-
ten characterised by divorce, second marriages, de facto 
unions with the individuals within a family often living 
at great geographical distances from one another. All of 
this makes it difficult to resolve conflicts that arise re-
garding wills and inheritance and thus there is a greater 
necessity to ascertain the testamentary capacities of the 
individual concerned.
Testamentary capacity (TC) may be defined as the 
ability of a person (testator/testatrix) to make his or her 
own will in a clear and valid way [71, 72]. While from 
a legal point of view TC is subject to variations from 
country to country in accordance with the relative civic 
codes, from a neuropsychological perspective it is based 
on two general functions, an individual’s capacity to un-
derstand relevant facts and to appreciate the reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of a decision.
As with other capacities, TC is considered to be 
present until proven otherwise, and a diagnosis of ill-
ness does not per se mean a deficit in TC [73, 74]. It is 
important to note that TC does not necessarily imply 
the ability to comprehend or manage complex finan-
cial transactions for instance [73, 75], but rather refers 
to a minimum level of the mental capacity required to 
make a will [75]. However, some cognitive abilities are 
in effect needed in order to create a will: individuals 
should be aware that they are making a plan to dispose 
of their estate after their death, to recognise the natural 
beneficiaries and to know the nature and extent of their 
estate. When there are doubts about whether these 
abilities are compromised, additional information is 
necessary and an assessment to establish the presence 
of capacity needs to be carried out. This is particularly 
important in those situations where cognitive abilities 
are apparently preserved, and deficits are hidden by ad-
equate social interactions.
A seminal contribution to the doctrine regarding TC 
was given by the Banks versus Goodfellow sentence, the 
criteria of which have been recently revised by Shulman 
and colleagues [76, 77]. According to their interpreta-
tion, the authors suggest that the testator must be able 
to understand not only the act of making a will but also 
its potential effects. He/she needs to know the nature 
and extent of his/her property and to be able to clearly 
communicate the distribution of this property (par-
ticularly if the current wishes are different from those 
previously expressed). In addition, the testator must 
be capable of evaluating the claims of those who might 
be expected to benefit from the estate and express the 
rationale behind his/her choices. Finally, the testator 
needs to be free of mental disorders. However, any such 
symptoms will only invalidate the will when they clearly 
influence the disposition of the estate [73].
In any situation where these abilities are in doubt, 
a specific assessment is required. As TC is a function 
relating to both legal and medical fields, a collabora-
tive approach is necessary to carry out an evaluation. 
Currently, any request for an assessment is usually ad-
vanced by a judge or a solicitor, often because there are 
disputes among the people involved in the inheritance 
or because there is the potential for a controversy in the 
future. However, when assisting a patient with demen-
tia and his/her family, we must take into account that 
the patient’s clinician may understand when and if it is 
appropriate to discuss making a will with the patient.
Unfortunately, to date there are no standardised tools 
for the clinical assessment of TC [77] and studies focus-
ing on instruments which have been specially designed 
for the investigation of TC in elderly people or people 
with dementia are meagre. As a consequence, clinicians 
are required to achieve a general picture of an indi-
vidual’s capacity by means of integrating psychometric 
measures and other complex information relating to the 
testator’s daily life and social relationships.
In general, assessments may be based on Retrospec-
tive or Contemporary evaluations.
Retrospective evaluations are requested when the 
testator is deceased and his/her mental state at the 
moment of drafting the will is being questioned. This 
process has been described as a sort of neuropsycho-
logical “autopsy”, that is, an evaluation of the testamen-
tary capacity of a person who has deceased and thus for 
whom an objective assessment is not available [78]. In 
this case, only collateral information and pre-mortem 
documentation are available in order for an opinion on 
the testator’s capacity to be formed. Useful information 
comes from the results of prior medical and nursing 
home records (with lists of the individual’s medications) 
and neuropsychological assessments, in addition to 
copies of other wills (when present), academic records, 
work performance records and financial transactions 
[72]. Medical reports should be collected in a system-
atic way following a “chronological” approach which 
























makes it possible to track the progress of the testator’s 
cognitive abilities. The date of the will is used as a refer-
ence point [79]. Another relevant source of information 
is the testator’s personal correspondence and anything 
they have written, both of which may reveal the qual-
ity of the testator’s interpersonal relationships and their 
intentions. Any other relevant legal documents can also 
be requested from people who were closely associated 
with the person in question, such as family members, 
close friends and medical staff (for details, see [79]).
Contemporary evaluation is, however, recommended 
where possible for obvious reasons. Unlike retrospec-
tive evaluations, in this type of assessment, it is pos-
sible for the examiner to garner a cognitive picture of 
the individual at the moment when the will was drafted. 
Furthermore, contemporary assessments represent a 
means of avoiding any subsequent inquiry into the req-
uisite decisional capacity of the person after their death 
thus preventing potential litigation, expense, and any 
negative impact on family relationships [77].
As in the case of clinical competence, the tools em-
ployed for the assessment of TC include cognitive tests, 
interviews or questionnaires, and a variety of instruments 
for functional assessment. General tests of cognitive abil-
ity are recommended [80, 81] since these furnish indica-
tions regarding an individual’s cognitive profile which 
will assist the examiner in the identification of strengths 
and weakness and in terms of deciding which cognitive 
functions need to be assessed in depth. In general, exec-
utive functions are assessed in order to have data regard-
ing the testator’s capacity for the planning and reasoning 
required for the distribution of his/her estate. Ability to 
calculate, working memory and cognitive estimation are 
tested with the aim of ascertaining the testator’s aware-
ness of the current values of any assets he/she wishes to 
bequeath. Tests relating to semantic and autobiographi-
cal memory allow the examiner to not only establish 
whether the testator understands the nature and extent 
of any properties to be disposed of, but also whether he/
she recalls the nature of his/her relationships and is able 
to evaluate any potential claims from people who might 
expect to benefit from the estate. Finally, language com-
petence is tested in order to ascertain whether the indi-
vidual is capable of understanding the text of a will and 
of communicating his/her personal wishes in a clear and 
rational way [82, 76, 77, 74, 79].
In the literature on the subject, there are some semi-
structured interviews that investigate financial capaci-
ties (e.g., Hopemont Capacity Assessment Interview 
(HCAI); the Financial Capacity Instrument (FCI) [83, 
53], but these are not specific to TC. The Testamentary 
Capacity Instrument (TCI) [82] is more specific and in-
volves a list of questions to be administered orally or in 
writing. The questions focus on the four legal criteria in-
troduced by Banks versus Goodfellow (1870): “he ought 
to be capable of making his Will with (i) an understand-
ing of the nature of the business in which he is engaged, 
(ii) a recollection of the property he means to dispose 
of, and (iii) of the persons who are the object of his 
bounty, and (iv) the manner in which it is to be distrib-
uted between them”. Finally, any functional assessment 
should comprise an evaluation of the daily activities the 
person engages in including those which are associated 
with the management of finances and properties.
Whatever instruments are chosen for an assessment, 
it is crucial that the examination follows a systematic 
approach which provides evidence both of any indi-
vidual weakness and any residual abilities and compe-
tencies. Furthermore, certain ethical aspects should be 
considered.
First of all, the testator needs to be informed about 
the specific, legal nature of the assessment and he/she 
must be informed that personal questions may be ad-
dressed to him/her that may be related to private issues. 
Whenever possible, assent for a cognitive evaluation 
should be requested, even if this could result in an im-
passe (i.e. when the patients themselves are asked for 
their consent to be assessed on their abilities to make 
a will). The person carrying out the evaluation should 
also clearly understand the main questions to be asked 
depending on whether, for example, there is a doubt 
regarding the testator’s ability to estimate his/her prop-
erty or comprehend financial issues or he/she has dif-
ficulty recognising his/her relatives.
Another aspect that is of value from an ethical point 
of view relates to the context of the assessment. In par-
ticular, this should be conducted in the absence of any-
one who might benefit from the will [73, 84]. This in 
some way guarantees a reduction of any external influ-
ences on the testator’s wishes. The risk of undue influ-
ence is particularly high in the case of vulnerable people 
or in cases where the testator’s wishes have changed 
over time. In these cases, it may be useful to identify 
the timeline of these changes and to understand the 
circumstances in which these happened in the context 
of the testator’s relationships. For example, a manipu-
lator may be identified in a person who acts in order 
to isolate the client from their usual support networks, 
encourage mistrust in others whilst winning over the 
client with gifts and acts of kindness, thus placing the 
individual in a position where they feel they are obliged 
to change their financial arrangements in favour of the 
potential manipulator [74].
Last but not least, TC assessment requires sufficient 
time. An ethical approach to evaluation may involve the 
necessity of collecting information from various differ-
ent sources and in various different contexts (e.g. not 
only in a clinical setting but also at the testator’s home). 
This may take more time and multiple sessions of as-
sessment may be necessary. Understanding the current 
capacities of an individual can often be a complex task 
and every effort must be made to realistically investi-
gate any remaining capacity.
 
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present review was to collect and 
synthesise current knowledge concerning two domains 
of capacity which are of particular interest for clinical 
purposes: the capacity to give informed consent and 
testamentary capacity. A multidisciplinary perspective 
that integrates ethical, medical-legal issues and clinical 
assessment was adopted. The aim was also to provide 
clinicians with a theoretical and empirical overview that 
might be useful in their clinical practice. Some consid-
























erations emerged from our revision of the scientific lit-
erature on the subject covering the last 30 years.
Firstly, to date there have been no tests designed to 
measure capacity: all of the tools available have been 
adapted from those used for clinical diagnostics, and 
they investigate specific functions rather than abilities, 
with the result that the scores do not provide any rel-
evant information concerning any compensatory, adap-
tive strategies implemented by the patient to face the 
demands of daily life [3]. Similarly, there are no stan-
dards for assessing capacity, probably due to the fact 
that patients vary greatly from one to another even 
though the diagnoses and levels of medical care are sim-
ilar [65]. There is also the question of the specificity of 
the various different contexts relative to each individual 
(e.g. the risk/benefit ratio). This means that a case-by-
case tailor made approach is required.
An issue in Italy regards the lack of translations and 
validation for structured interviews (e.g., informed con-
sent, driving skills, testamentary skills, etc), that are 
widespread in English-speaking countries where these 
have been developed and validated. Although inter-
views should not be considered as indicators of ability 
but integrated into a neuropsychological examination, 
the absence of translations and validations constitutes a 
serious limitation for the Italian health system [7].
Secondly, the lack of a gold standard is now the great-
est challenge since the complexity of assessments of 
capacity cannot be reduced to simple scores for cogni-
tive tests or questionnaires but is a complex endeavour 
involving cross-disciplinary knowledge involving, for 
instance, ethics, law, neuropsychology and neurosci-
ence [59]. Cognitive and emotional abilities, personal 
values and experiences are also important factors that 
influence decision-making. None of the instruments 
currently available are sufficiently flexible or broad in 
scope for individual and contextual factors to be taken 
into consideration, and thus in-depth investigations and 
consideration of every patient’s narratives are essential.
In light of this, the following ethical recommenda-
tions for the neuropsychological evaluation of capacity 
are particularly important [3, 11, 85]:
i) the use of several tools and various different ap-
proaches to the evaluation of the patient’s daily life 
functioning skills; 
ii) respect for his/her residual autonomy to whatever 
degree it is present and 
iii) a tailored approach to his/her emotional, func-
tional and cognitive responses, as well as to clinical and 
socio-demographic conditions.
Thirdly, an issue which we consider needs to be ad-
dressed emerged from the present review. This concerns 
the lack of emphasis on the concept of awareness within 
any assessment of capacity. Anosognosia (i.e., a lack of 
awareness) is a multifaceted syndrome that may affect 
patients with dementia. Awareness has been defined 
as “a reasonable or realistic perception or appraisal 
of a given aspect of one’s situation, functioning, per-
formance, or of the resulting implications, which may 
be expressed explicitly or implicitly” [86]. In cases of 
mental deterioration, anosognosia may involve some 
cognitive functions and not others, and often concerns 
impairments in daily activities [87, 88]. Although not 
directly correlated with capacity, in AD awareness 
needs to be specifically investigated [89-91]. In fact, an 
inability to recognise one own’s symptoms may lead pa-
tients to make inadequate decisions [92].
It is noteworthy that awareness shares some brain 
networks with decision-making. Recent studies indicate 
a role of the medial structures in anosognosia, in par-
ticular the right temporal medial cortex, including the 
hippocampus [93] There are also disconnections within 
medial subsystems of the default mode network, sub-
serving autobiographic memory and emotional states 
[94, 95]. We thus consider that an evaluation of capac-
ity in a patient with dementia should not ignore tests 
regarding the awareness of self and of one’s own symp-
toms and disease.
Lastly, it is worth considering two ethical issues. The 
first arises from a reflection on the subject of autonomy 
proposed by Reichlin in Ethics and neuroscience (p. 112) 
[96]: “autonomy (in dementia) cannot be conceived of 
as being based on the full decision-making freedom to 
make decisions, by a rational individual, who is fully in-
formed and capable of pursuing a proper life plan. This 
representation, which is disproportionate in any indi-
vidual made weak and vulnerable by a disease, appears 
to be altogether inapplicable to patients suffering from 
dementia”.
If this is the case, autonomy cannot be the only value 
involved in the physician-patient relationship. It must 
also be accompanied by the concept of “best interest”, 
which includes not only respect for the individual’s 
previous wishes, but should also take into account the 
care required for his/her current well-being and qual-
ity of life. The second issue relates to the impact of 
ethical principles on clinical practice [97]. The care of 
dementia is deeply intertwined with ethical aspects, in 
all clinical and personal interactions, and general ethi-
cal principles such as “respect for patient autonomy” 
and “beneficence” should be at the basis of all medical 
decisions at every step (e.g. the communication of the 
diagnosis, information about the clinical course of the 
disease, drug therapy, etc.).
In conclusion, we consider that our findings will be 
useful for both clinicians and law practitioners when an 
analysis of protective measures and the patient’s need 
for guardianship is being carried out. Limiting the role 
of guardianship to complex decisions may be enough 
to protect the majority of patients suffering from mild 
forms of AD. Less restrictive legal options, such as sup-
porting in decision-making, might be applied for sim-
pler decisions.
Limits
Our paper is structured as a systematic review. It 
focuses on reviews rather than on original articles, a 
choice which was necessitated by the multidisciplinary 
approach adopted and the long-time window consid-
ered (30 years). Unfortunately, quantitative findings on 
this topic are few. The field of systematic reviews on 
ethical issues lacks broadly consented standards, such 
as those available for systematic reviews on clinical re-
search [98].
























Moreover, the study does not consider the symptom-
atic predementia phase – that is, mild cognitive impair-
ment (MCI). Along with the ascertaining of capacity 
in patients with dementia, some studies have focused 
on MCI, showing that some of these patients exhibit 
problems with making competent decisions, in particu-
lar regarding treatments and research protocols [40]. 
However, the diagnostic criteria for MCI state that 
cognitive changes should be sufficiently mild as not to 
compromise social and occupational functioning [99]. 
Furthermore, a reversion to normality has been de-
scribed as a common outcome in this condition [100]. 
Addressing the issue of competence in MCI thus de-
serves a specific investigation and is beyond the scope 
of this study, which originated from the National De-
mentia Plan [7].
The main limitation of our study is probably due to 
the “cultural” bias present in the review of the litera-
ture. Indeed, the studies reported refer to various cul-
tural contexts and legislative contexts and this makes it 
difficult to make comparisons. On the other hand, all 
of these studies came from Europe and North America 
and thus we cannot exclude the possibility that a rethink 
of the constructs of capacity and competence might be 
necessary when investing different cultural contexts.
Another limitation is that it was extremely difficult 
to find a solution to the issue regarding the confusion 
in terminology involving the various different shades of 
meaning that the authors give to the concepts of auton-
omy in competence and self-determination. We consid-
er that only thorough integration between the many dif-
ferent professionals (e.g., legislators, judges, clinicians 
and neuropsychologists) will overcome this problem.
Finally, the interaction between cognitive and emo-
tional dimensions in relation to the definition of capac-
ity was not specifically discussed in this review as the 
literature on the subject is meagre. Further studies are 
necessary to investigate this relationship since it is fun-
damental in order to respect individuals in their unique-
ness.
CONCLUSIONS
The evaluation of capacity in patients with dementia 
has several crucial aspects. On the one hand, these are 
linked to the patient’s fragility which requires special 
care from people who are in contact with him/her (e.g., 
judges, caregivers and clinicians). Unfortunately, the 
urge to exclude the patient from the decisional process 
is common in real life, but his/her participation should 
instead be enhanced and validated. On the other hand, 
capacity is not a dichotomous condition to be merely 
defined as “present/absent”. It always refers to a specific 
decision, in a given context and at a given time [101].
This involves an all-encompassing tailored approach 
to the assessment of capacity, and a continuous effort 
to help the patient to express his/her opinion when 
applying standardised procedures in a clinical setting. 
Clinicians should therefore be well trained in order to 
develop such skills, and to bear constantly in mind the 
importance of demonstrating respect for the autonomy 
and dignity of the patient.
The implementation of a series of tools to aid assess-
ments of capacity and the validation of ad hoc ques-
tionnaires are strongly recommended in order for the 
current limitations in clinical practice to be overcome.
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